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A CONTRACTARIAN DEFENSE OF CORPORATE
PHILANTHROPY*
Margaret M. Blair**
I INTRODUCTION
Although a lively debate raged in the law from the mid-19th
century to the mid-20th century about whether, and under what
circumstances, corporations could give away funds to humanitarian,
charitable, or philanthropic causes, this question appeared to be
settled by the 1950s. Since then, both statutory and case law have
made it clear that corporate officers and directors have very wide
discretion to direct reasonable amounts of corporate resources to-
ward artistic, educational, and humanitarian causes,' even those
that have only a remote connection (or no obvious connection at all)
to the business goals and profitability of the firm.
* Paper prepared for presentation at Stetson University College of Law Corporate
Philanthropy Symposium, November 7-8, 1997. Work on this paper has been supported
by the Brookings project on Corporations and Human Capital, which is funded in part
by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Pfizer Corporation. The opinions expressed in
this article are the Author's, and should not be attributed to Brookings, its officers,
directors, or financial supporters.
** Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, and Visiting Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. In 1935, the tax code was changed to make it clear that charitable contribu-
tions by corporations were deductible. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate
Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of
Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1994) (recounting the history behind the adoption
of § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that charitable contributions by
corporations are deductible); see also Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the
Tax Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835 (1997) (critiquing
the economic and philosophical rationale behind § 170). In the late 1940s and early
1950s, most states amended their corporation laws to make clear that corporations could
donate reasonable amounts of funds to charitable, educational, or philanthropic causes.
See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(m), 4 (1960) (citing 31 states that had
amended their corporation statutes between 1945 and 1955 to allow charitable contribu-
tions, and listing 9 states that had done so between 1917 and 1945). In some cases, the
statutes imposed some restrictions and procedural requirements on such expenditures.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-103 (1996) (allowing corporations to
make contributions if authorized by the board of directors). Most of these statutes
followed the corporate philanthropy provision codified as section 4(m) of the Model
Business Corporation Act in 1950. A 1953 case, AP. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), set the precedent that courts have since followed on the
question. See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 2.01 (1994) (stating that "a corporation . . . [m]ay devote a reasonable amount
of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes").
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This stance of the law has been defended primarily by refer-
ence to an entity theory of the firm. Under this theory, the corpora-
tion is itself a separate legal "person," with individual rights under
the law, and it is therefore appropriate to expect, and even demand,
that corporations be "good citizens," and that they behave in "social-
ly responsible" ways, including contributing to "socially responsible"
causes.! Corporate officers and directors, who act for this entity,
must therefore be protected when they expend corporate resources
on philanthropy.
But while the law appears to be settled, there is still an influ-
ential strand of legal thinking, particularly among scholars steeped
in the jurisprudence of law and economics, that argues that corpo-
rate giving, if it is permitted at all, should be strictly limited to
those situations where the benefit to the firm in the form of higher
expected profits is clear and compelling. The argument against
corporate philanthropy of a more general nature, as well as against
other forms of gratuitous acts by corporations in the name of corpo-
rate "social responsibility," was made forcefully by Milton Friedman
in 1962 in a famous and often-quoted essay.' Friedman's view was
that a corporation is a special purpose institution for managing and
governing private property - in particular, the private property of
the shareholders. For corporate managers and directors to do any-
thing with that property other than what the shareholders want
them to do (which, presumably, is to increase profits) would be
tantamount to expropriating resources that do not belong to them,
and would violate the terms of their employment agreement.4 Ar-
2. See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1005, 1013 (1989) (suggesting that "[like each indi-
vidual, the firm was a citizen in society with civic responsibilities"). See generally JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970). For a critical discussion of the use of an entity
theory of the firm as the basis for the tax treatment of corporate philanthropy, see
Sugin, supra note 1, at 839-63.
3. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32. Friedman's more scholarly treat-
ment of his arguments was laid out in MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962).
4. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 33. "In a free-enterprise, private property
system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has
direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in
accordance with their desires . . . ." Id. Friedman was willing to concede, however, that
there are two legitimate constraints on the basic charge of corporate officers and di-
rectors to "make as much money as possible." Id. These constraints are "the basic rules
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom." Id.
[Vol. XXVIII
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guments to the same effect by subsequent contractarian legal schol-
ars have generally been couched in terms of "principal-agent" theo-
ry (in which the central contractual relationship in a corporation is
understood as an agency relationship between the shareholders,
who are the real "owners" of the corporation's property and act as
"principals," and the directors and managers who serve as their
"agents").5
This paper provides an alternative defense of managerial dis-
cretion with respect to corporate philanthropy that embraces the
contractarian reasoning of Friedman and his proteges, but follows
that reasoning to a different conclusion. I argue that Friedman's
conclusions apply only to a very narrow and special case, one in
which the corporation in question is a mere holding device for as-
sets that could, in principle at least, be held directly by the share-
holders without serious costs in terms of operational efficiency.' In
nearly all relevant cases, however, the publicly-traded corporate
form is used in situations in which important assets of the firm -
the things that make it valuable - include things that are intangi-
ble and inalienable. The property rights to assets such as certain
kinds of intellectual capital, or organizational capital, for example,
could not, even in principle, be assigned directly to shareholders
because the assets are imbedded in the "human capital" of the em-
5. The literature analyzing corporate law in terms of a principal-agent model is
enormous and too voluminous to cite, but begins with several articles by economists. See,
e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976). Legal scholars have also viewed the corporation from this perspective. See, e.g.,
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW (1991); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric
of Contract, 85 COLu i. L. REV. 1403 (1985); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Articles specifically addressing
corporate philanthropy from this perspective include Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate
Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1147 (1997); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on
Silence and Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1107 (1997);
Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corpo-
rate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997) [hereinafter Kahn, Pandora's Box];
Sugin, supra note 1.
6. Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Corporation is an example. Other holding
companies and investment companies might also be examples. But in almost any corpo-
ration with a significant number of employees, and actual operations, it would be impos-
sible, or prohibitively costly in terms of transactions costs, for shareholders to directly
own the assets used in production.
1998]
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ployees.
If shareholders do not and cannot directly "own" the assets of
the corporation, then a corporation cannot be merely the private
property of shareholders, nor can it even be a mechanism for man-
aging the private property of shareholders. And, if shareholders do
not "own" either the corporation or its assets, the principal-agent
model relied upon by so many legal scholars as a basis for under-
standing the relationships among shareholders, boards, and direc-
tors, is rendered inapplicable. Or, at the least, its application is
limited to a narrow subset of governance problems. In the contem-
porary operating corporation, where human capital, intellectual
capital, organizational capital, and other forms of intangible assets
are likely to be quite important,7 I argue Friedman's logic does not
necessarily imply that officers and directors should focus single-
mindedly on increasing profits.
What is a corporation if it is not a bundle of assets "owned" by
shareholders? I argue that a corporation is better understood as an
institutional arrangement for governing a "team production" pro-
cess.8 As such, it is more than simply a "nexus of contracts." It is a
mechanism by which the terms of a complex set of interrelated
relationships can be continuously written, revised, and enforced.
These relationships are "contractual" in the sense that individuals
enter into them voluntarily. But, the "contracts" are necessarily
incomplete. When a firm is incorporated, participants in the enter-
prise (team members) implicitly agree, not to a set of outcomes, but
7. By some estimates, less than half of the market value of the equity in the
publicly-traded corporate sector is accounted for by the book value of ownable assets
such as property, plant, and equipment. See, e.g., Lowell L. Bryan, Stocks Overvalued?
Not in the New Economy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at A22.
8. This argument is developed in detail in Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (manu-
script on file with authors). Luigi Zingales notes that at least three definitions of a
"firm" have appeared in the economic literature in recent years. See Luigi Zingales, Cor-
porate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
(forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 4-5, on file with author). Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 779 (1972), define a firm as a nexus of contracts. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 (1986), and Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990), define a firm as a collection
of physical assets that are jointly owned. And, Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 387-88 (1998), define a firm as a
nexus of specific investments. The argument about the economic function of a "corpora-
tion" in Blair & Stout, supra, draws from each of these three ideas about "firms."
[Vol. XXVIII
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to a decisionmaking process. The private governance structure and
internal decisionmaking process established by the act of incorpo-
ration, then, serves as a substitute for the complex, multilateral
contracts that would otherwise be required to govern those relation-
ships.
An essential feature of that governance structure is that all of
the participants in the firm agree to give up property rights over
key inputs used in the joint enterprise, as well as any direct claims
to the outputs. Inputs contributed by various stakeholders (espe-
cially those contributed by shareholders and employees) become the
property of the corporation itself, and decisions about their use and
allocation are governed by an internal hierarchy.9 At the top of
that hierarchy is the board of directors, which has extremely wide
discretion under the law to make decisions about the use of the as-
sets, and about the allocation of any economic surplus (rents) gen-
erated by the enterprise. This type of governance structure (a hier-
archy headed by a board of directors) is virtually unique to the publicly-
traded corporate form. ° Careful contractarian scholars, then, un-
derstand that calling shareholders the "owners" of corporations, or
referring to the assets of corporations as "shareholders' property,"
or the profits as "shareholders' money," is a rhetorical trick that,
while powerful, is misleading, since it is neither an accurate de-
scription of the legal role that shareholders play in corporations nor
a particularly informative statement about their economic role."
9. Equity capital contributed by shareholders becomes corporate property immedi-
ately. Intellectual capital contributed by employees must first be converted to alienable
property, in the form of patents, copyrights, engineering plans, operations manuals, etc.,
and these are then owned by the corporation. Although firm-specific skills developed by
employees are technically not the property of the firm, they are, by definition, valueless
to the employee outside the firm. So they, too, are stuck in the firm, where their use is
subject to considerable control by management of the firm.
10. See Blair & Stout, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4 & nn.6-7) (noting: "An inde-
pendent board of directors is one of the most important characteristics distinguishing
public corporations from other forms of enterprise.").
11. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
856, 904 n.22 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995)) (arguing that "Iblecause shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together
by the web of voluntary agreements, ownership should not be a particularly meaningful
concept in nexus-of-contracts theory. Someone owns each input, but no one owns the
totality."); see also Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Ownership: A Misleading Word Muddies
the Corporate Governance Debate, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1995, at 16. I agree with
Bainbridge except to note that the individual team members may not necessarily own all
of the inputs either.
1998]
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Why do investors, employees, and other participants in the
enterprise agree to relinquish property rights to a passive legal
entity (the "corporation") controlled by a relatively unconstrained
hierarchy? Since they do so freely when they enter into their rela-
tionship with the corporation, it seems reasonable to presume that
they do so because they believe they will gain more than they will
lose. In other words, they believe that the efficiency costs from the
occasional misuse of power by executives and directors who are
empowered to make decisions about the use of "corporate" assets
will generally be far less than the costs of detailed and explicit
contracting among the participants, or team members, would be. If
the corporate form did not serve their needs in this particular way,
presumably they would seek out an alternative arrangement to
govern their relationships. 2
Understanding that a corporation is a mechanism for governing
a productive "team" directs attention to the fact that participating
team members other than shareholders have often contributed
inputs whose value is at risk in the corporation. The process of
governing the relationships among all of those stakeholders inevi-
tably involves trade-offs, judgment calls, and decisions that weigh
the interests of one group against the interests of others. Vast dis-
cretion is required for corporate officers and directors to do this job.
If the decisionmaking process within corporate hierarchies were
captured and controlled by one set of stakeholders, other
stakeholders might eventually cease to cooperate, to withhold in-
puts in the future, and try to withdraw inputs over which they have
influence, at least to the extent that they could. It is, therefore, in
the long-run best interests of shareholders as a class (although not
necessarily of particular shareholders in particular firms) that man-
agers and directors have discretion to make trade-offs among the
corporation's many stakeholders and to allocate the economic rents
as they deem necessary or desirable. In other words, I argue, the
legislatures and the courts have been right to grant managers and
directors broad discretion with respect to all kinds of decisions
within corporations.
Hence, I differ from Friedman and most subsequent
contractarian corporate law scholars in two major respects in the
12. Many alternative arrangements exist under the law, including direct contract-
ing, limited partnerships, closely-held firms, and limited liability companies, and other
forms might emerge if they were found to be valuable.
[Vol. XXVIII
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conclusions I draw from contractarian reasoning. First, I acknowl-
edge the complex nature of modern corporations in which the "as-
sets" at risk include many things that shareholders could never
own directly, but that are nonetheless affected - sometimes dra-
matically - by the decisions of managers and directors. In light of
this fact, I suggest that the principal-agent model is a misleading
metaphor to use to analyze most problems in corporate law, includ-
ing those surrounding corporate philanthropy. Following the joint
work of Blair and Stout,3 I propose instead that a more appropri-
ate model for understanding corporate law is a "team production"
model. Second, I show how this model provides a contractarian
justification for why managers and directors must be given wide
discretion in making decisions about the use of such assets, and the
allocation of the returns from them. My argument applies to deci-
sions to use corporate assets for philanthropic or charitable contri-
butions as much as it applies to decisions about the transfer price
for services provided by one subsidiary of a corporation to another,
or about the division of a bonus pool among a group of employees.
In Section II, I review the argument that corporations should
be understood as institutional solutions to the contracting problem
inherent in team production. 4 In Section IR, I show why the his-
torical development of statutory and case law with respect to corpo-
rate philanthropy is consistent with the "team production" theory of
the economic function of corporate law. And in Section IV, I draw a
few conclusions about the implications of the "team production"
theory for the broader debate about the so-called "social responsibil-
ities" of corporations.
II. THE TEAM PRODUCTION PROBLEM
A. The Need for an Alternative to the Principal-Agent Model
Scholarly studies of corporation law and corporate governance
in recent years have been dominated by an underlying view that a
firm is, essentially, a bundle of assets that belongs to sharehold-
ers. 5 This conception of the firm is clearly different from, and not
13. See Blair & Stout, supra note 8.
14. Section II draws heavily on arguments made at length in Blair & Stout, supra
note 8.
15. Friedman, supra note 3, at 33, is clearly based on this notion. Grossman &
Hart, supra note 8, at 693, and Hart & Moore, supra note 8, at 1120, probably contrib-
ute to the general acceptance of this view by defining a firm as the assets under corn-
1998]
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necessary to, the contractarian notion of a firm as a "nexus of con-
tracts." The "bundle of assets" view, nonetheless, lurks in the back-
ground in a large part of the contractarian legal scholarship on
corporate governance, providing a rationale for the recurring notion
that the central contracting problem to be solved by governance
arrangements in a corporation is a "principal-agent" problem: How
can the "principals" (understood to be the shareholders) get their
"agents" (understood to be managers and directors) to manage the
firm in the best interests of the principals?16
But the idea that managers and directors are "agents" of
"shareholders" has always been at odds with the way corporation
law actually works."7 Under American corporate law, directors and
officers of a corporation are not agents of shareholders. Managers
are agents of the corporation itself, and directors are sui generis.
Directors are not subject to direct control by shareholders, and they
owe no duty of obedience to shareholders. Confronted by these un-
comfortable facts, contractarian legal scholars generally retreat to
the "metaphor" argument: It doesn't matter that there is no explicit
legally enforceable agency contract between shareholders and direc-
tors. The "principal-agent" story is still a useful metaphor for the
mon ownership. Numerous other scholars and commentators implicitly accept this idea in
casual references to "shareholders' money.' See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 1, at 837 (arguing
that "the [tax] Code has legitimized the power of management to spend the shareholders'
money for charitable purposes").
16. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 277, 277 (1996) ("The fundamental task of corporate law is to provide
a framework of governance institutions that mitigate the agency problem arising from
the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation - that the interests
of the managers who control corporate decisionmaking may not coincide with the inter-
ests of their principals, the corporation's owners."). Other obligatory cites include
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5; Fama, supra note 5; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 5.
An alternative strand of contractarian thinking about the nature of the firm has
stressed the inevitable incompleteness of the contracts that make up the firm, and has
focused on mechanisms for filling in the gaps in incomplete contracts. Leading works in
this area are Grossman & Hart, supra note 8, at 693, and Hart & Moore, supra note 8,
at 1120, who note that among the most important such mechanisms are property rights
- which give the "owners" of an asset the residual right of control over that asset.
These authors then appeal explicitly to the "bundle of assets" view of the firm by
defining a firm as a collection of physical assets under common control.
17. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1987) (stating that "[t]o an experienced corporate lawyer who has
studied primary legal materials, the assertion that corporate managers are agents of
investors . . . will seem odd or loose").
[Vol. XXVII
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nature of the relationship between shareholders and directors.
I approach the problem differently. I do not develop an elabo-
rate set of stories about how the rules of corporation law, and the
internal rules governing specific corporations, function "as if they
arose through the trading of rights and duties among the corpora-
tion's various constituencies and... represent a bargain."8 Rath-
er, I scrap the whole "bundle of assets" metaphor, and the "princi-
pal-agent" model based on it, and build a contractarian story about
the nature of corporations that starts with a different central meta-
phor. The central contractual problem to be solved by the formation
of a corporation, and by the structure of corporate law, is not a
principal-agent problem (which could be solved through contract
law). It is a "team production" problem.
B. The Contracting Problems in Team Production
Team production problems are not well-studied in economics,
although they are ubiquitous in the economy. They arise in situa-
tions in which a number of different parties contribute difficult-to-
monitor inputs of varying types to a productive process, and in
which the output of that process is "non-separable," meaning that it
is impossible to determine which part of the output is attributable
to which input. Alchian and Demsetz, who originated the notion
that a firm is a nexus of contracts, developed that idea in the con-
text of an article that was about team production problems. 9 If
the output of a joint production process is non-separable, they not-
ed, team members cannot simply be compensated for their contribu-
tions by paying them the "share" of the output that they produced,
or for which they are responsible. There is no obvious, a priori rule
to use to divide up the output, and if any sharing rule is estab-
lished ex ante, team members will have an incentive to shirk, or
"free-ride" on the efforts of other team members. This is because if
team members contract in advance to share the output according to
a particular rule, then all team members will share the costs of
shirking, while only the individual team member who shirks will
enjoy the benefits of shirking."
Alchian and Demsetz argued that the solution to the team
18. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 869.
19. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 8.
20. This argument was first made formally by Bengt Holmstrom, in Moral Hazard
in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982).
1998]
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production problem is that one team member is assigned the task of
monitoring all the other team members to be sure none of them
shirk. Except for the monitor, all team members are paid according
to their marginal opportunity cost, and the monitor receives any
economic surplus or "rents" created by the activities of the team.
The monitor, in their story, becomes the "owner" of the capitalist
firm,21 and they therefore argue that their story provides a ratio-
nale for capitalist firms.
Holmstrom, however, noted that the Alchian and Demsetz
"solution" doesn't really solve the most interesting team production
problem: If it were possible to monitor effectively the inputs of the
team members, it would be possible to contract directly for the
inputs. The interesting and troubling case occurs in situations in
which it is difficult or impossible to monitor and contract directly
for the inputs, he said.22
Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore' consider another
variation on the team production problem. Rather than thinking of
the inputs of the team members as actions that are difficult to
monitor, they think of the inputs as investments that must be made
- for example, in firm-specific skills - that are difficult to specify
and verify contractually. The team will be most productive if all of
the team members invest, but the ex ante incentive that each team
member has to invest depends on how much of the rents she thinks
she can capture, which, in turn, depends on who has what bargain-
ing power over the rents ex post.
1. Problematic Solutions
Several solutions to the intractable contracting problems in-
volved in team production have been proposed, none of them wholly
satisfactory. Holmstrom, for example, asks whether it would be
possible to write a contract among the team members that allocates
all of the output among them according to some ex ante sharing
rule, and that would still provide the right incentives to keep each
of them from shirking. He concludes that this is not possible, for
the reasons stated above. Any ex ante sharing rule gives individual
21. This "solution" allowed the "bundle of assets" view of the firm to persist, and
for many years after Alchian and Demsetz wrote their article, team production problems
were treated as a subset of principal-agent problems.
22. See Holmstrom, supra note 20, at 327.
23. Grossman & Hart, supra note 8.
24. Hart & Moore, supra note 8.
[Vol. XXVIII
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team members an incentive to free ride.' The solution he proposes
is a contract in which economic surpluses (rents) are distributed to
team members only if they reach some minimum level. This solu-
tion creates a new problem, however: How to dispose of rents that
fall short of the contractual minimum, without corrupting the origi-
nal contract? If sub-contractual rents are to be paid out to team
members, then team members once again have an incentive to free
ride. But, if they are paid out to any outside party that has any
influence over the behavior of team members, that outside party
would have the perverse incentive to try to bribe one or more team
members to shirk, in order to be sure that the rents fall short of the
amount that would trigger payout to the team members.
Holmstrom suggests that outside shareholders in public corpo-
rations play the "budget balancing" role by being the recipients of
the sub-contractual rents. Thus, he suggests, his model provides an
explanation for the passive role played by outside shareholders in
the publicly-traded corporation. Holmstrom's argument has not
received much attention, probably because the role he ascribes to
shareholders does not fit a common understanding about the role
shareholders actually play."
Grossman and Hart' and Hart and Moore" suggest an alter-
native solution. They assume that a complete contract cannot be
written, so that, once production is underway, the rents generated
by production will be up for grabs and will be allocated to the team
members according to the bargaining power that each team mem-
ber has. This leads them to focus on the role played by ownership
rights in determining the outcome of the ex post bargaining. They
note that if one of the team members is assigned a priori ownership
rights (meaning that team member has the residual right to control
decisions about the use of assets) over the output, that team mem-
ber will have more bargaining power in negotiations over the rents,
and will consequently be assured that she will be able to capture
the value of any investment she makes in producing the assets. She
25. See Holmstrom, supra note 20, at 327. Gary Miller refers to this argument as
"Holmstrom's impossibility result." See Gary Miller, Tying the Owner's Hands: The Moral
Hazard of Profit-Maximization 12 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. Apart from the passivity question, Holmstrom's story differs from our common
understanding because, in his model, higher than target levels of profits would be paid
out to employees, while shareholders would only get paid when profits were below
target.
27. Grossman & Hart, supra note 8.
28. Hart & Moore, supra note 8.
1998]
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will therefore have a higher incentive to make the required invest-
ments (i.e., to work hard and not shirk) in the first place. In other
words, ownership rights discourage shirking. Hence, these authors
suggest that a priori ownership rights to the output will have the
highest value to the individual whose own investments (in, say,
effort, or firm-specific human capital) are the most critical to the
enterprise.
Of course, if one team member owns the output of the joint
production process, the other team members will have much less
incentive to invest under these circumstances. So the Grossman-
Hart-Moore solution is not very helpful if there are numerous team
members whose inputs are critical. Nonetheless, their story pro-
vides some insight into the economic function of ownership in an
entrepreneurial firm, in which a single individual owns the critical
assets and output of the firm, and contracts - albeit imperfectly -
for inputs from the other members of the "team."
2. Corporations as an Alternative Solution
Blair and Stout offer a third solution.' They argue that struc-
turing the firm as a publicly-traded corporation helps to solve the
team production problem in a way that incorporates and makes
sense out of both Holmstrom's solution and the Grossman-Hart-
Moore solution. When a public corporation is formed, property
rights over critical inputs and over enterprise outputs are assigned
to the corporation itself, a passive legal entity that is separate from
any of the individual team members. Control rights over the firm's
assets are thereby taken away from individual team members and
assigned to managers, who are legally required to act as agents of
the corporation rather than being permitted to act in their own
interests. Managers, in turn, are subject to the control of directors,
who act as trustees for the firm itself, rather than as agents for any
specific participants or group of participants in the firm.
The problem identified by Holmstrom is solved because the
corporation itself - a legal entity that is inherently passive -
serves the function of "budget-breaker." Output can simply be re-
tained and not paid out to any team members if it is not large
enough (whatever "large enough" means)." The Grossman-Hart-
29. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 8.
30. Most economists and finance theorists think of retained earnings as being
added to the equity value of the firm, and hence, going to shareholders. If financial
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Moore problem is solved because none of the team members have
ownership rights over the output of the firm, so none of them are in
a position legally to expropriate all the rents from the other team
members.3' This helps to keep all of the team members on board
and committed to the enterprise. The nature of the "contract" en-
tered into by all the team members is a "pactum subjectionis,"32 in
which all agree to give up control rights to a supposedly neutral
and independent board of directors.
Why would team members want to participate in an arrange-
ment that required them to give up property rights over their out-
put? They would if they believed that the total team output would
be larger, and that therefore, the share of the total output they
would receive in return for their contributions to the team would be
larger than the output they could produce by themselves.
C. Why Managers and Directors Need Wide Discretion
The Blair and Stout solution implies that directors and officers
of the firm must have considerable discretion and protection from
the influence of particular team members. They must be free, for
example, to withhold bonus payments if production targets are not
met, or to cut the dividend payments, or to redirect some resources
to entice a new team member to join. And they must be protected
from overweening influence or control by any particular team mem-
bers as they decide the allocation of the rents. The Blair and Stout
model, then, provides an economic rationale, consistent with
contractarian legal thinking, for the enormous discretion over the
markets were perfect and there were no taxes, finance theory says retained earnings
would be equivalent to dividends in terms of its impact on the value of equity securities.
See generally Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961). But retained earnings do not belong to
shareholders and might never be paid out to them at all. As long as they remain in the
firm, they could be drawn down in future years to reward other stakeholders. This
possibility is cause for great alarm among theorists such as Michael Jensen, who, relying
on a "bundle of assets" view of the firm, regard retained earnings as the property of
shareholders, and consequently fret about the "agency problems" that arise over the use
of "free cash flow." See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Cor-
porate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
31. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 8, at 422-23, suggest that the solution to the
Grossman-Hart-Moore problem is to assign ownership rights to a neutral third party.
32. The phrase is associated with Thomas Hobbes' idea that people might submit
themselves to a coercive monarch in order to avoid a destructive war "of every one
against every one." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier
Books 1962) (1651).
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use of corporate assets granted under corporate law to corporate
officers and directors. Corporate directors and officers who are do-
ing their job well will attempt to allocate resources and rents in
such a way as to maximize the total rents being created. But, team
members, having yielded control rights, may not be able to force
them to do so. Moreover, since maximizing the total rents is not
necessarily the same thing as maximizing the rents being captured
by any one subset of participants in the firm, it does not necessarily
lead to more efficient use of economic resources to give one subset
of team members the power to force decisions that are in their
interest.'
If corporate law doesn't provide direct mechanisms by which
managers can be forced to make decisions that are aimed at maxi-
mizing the total rents being created by the team, what keeps the
team generating rents? We argue that team members themselves
are motivated to generate rents (as well as to maneuver to try to
capture more of them), as long as they believe they will be able to
capture enough of them so that they will make more by being part
of the team than they would by operating alone.
For the most part, team members in a corporation will work
out among themselves how to get this done: who zigs when, who
zags when, who is responsible for what, and who gets what. The
internal hierarchy of a corporation, of course, helps to set goals and
coordinate that process by serving as a central node for processing
information.' But, it also serves another important function not
previously emphasized by economists. It provides a mechanism for
resolving disputes over the distribution of the rents generated by
the enterprise. Many of the terms by which the rents are distribut-
ed are not "contractual," in the sense that they are not enforceable
by an outside party such as a court." Instead, they can be resolved
33. The Blair and Stout model, then, provides a contractarian argument that justi-
fies E. Merrick Dodd's view that managers and directors of corporations are fiduciaries
whd are supposed to act on behalf not just of shareholders, but of all those who have an
interest in the business. See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1932).
34. See, e.g., Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON.
LTERATURE 1382, 1382 (1992) (surveying the economic literature on hierarchy as a
system for gathering and processing information).
35. Courts routinely refuse to hear disputes between two divisions of the same
company over transfer prices, quality, timely delivery, etc., as well as internal disputes
such as those that might arise over the distribution of a bonus pool. See George Baker
et al., Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm 14 (Apr. 17, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (distinguishing transactions that take place within a
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only by appealing to the internal hierarchy of the firm. When, on
occasion, disputes rise to the level of the board of directors sitting
at the top of that hierarchy, the board is given very wide discretion
under the law to make the final call. Thus, the board of directors of
Chrysler Corporation decided to increase greatly its dividend in re-
sponse to pressure from its major shareholder, Kirk Kerkorian, and
that matter was neither submitted to a vote of shareholders nor
taken to the courts to resolve. 6 This fact is at odds with a view
that a corporation is the property of shareholders, and directors are
their "agents" of shareholders. But, it is consistent with a view that
the corporation is a governance structure designed to govern the
relationships among participants in a team production process, and
directors are the "mediating hierarchs."
37
III. THE LAW ON CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
The Blair and Stout view of the social and economic function of
corporation law provides a contractarian explanation for the broad
discretion given corporate managers and directors under the busi-
ness judgment rule, and for the fact that directors do not owe a
duty of obedience to shareholders. It also explains the pattern of
case law and statutory law on corporate philanthropy.
As other scholars have explored in far more detail than I will
firm (in particular, between a buyer of a worker's services and the worker acting as an
"employee") from those that occur across a market (between a buyer of a worker's
services and the worker acting as a "contractor") by whether or not the courts will hear
disputes over the transaction). Being "in a firm," then, means operating subject to the
internal dispute resolution systems within that firm.
36. See Warren Brown, Kerkorian's Bid to Buy Chrysler Called Doomed, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 27, 1995, at B10. Had Kerkorian asked the Delaware court to compel Chrys-
ler to pay out a larger dividend, he almost surely would have been rebuffed. As long as
there are no allegations of director self-dealing, or other violations of directors' fiduciary
duties, and as long as surpluses are sufficient that creditors and preferred shareholders
are protected, matters of dividend policy are protected under the business judgment rule
under Delaware law. See Gabelli & Co. Profit Sharing Plan v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444
A.2d 261, 264-66 (Del. Ch. 1982) (holding that "[a] decision to declare a dividend is a
matter ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the Board of Directors invoking, as it
does, important business considerations. Prior Delaware cases have permitted directors
wide latitude in making this decision and the declaring of a dividend is considered a
routine matter which enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment" and that "it is
settled in Delaware that the Court of Chancery will not compel payment of a dividend
unless the corporation is in the proper business and financial posture to do so, and if
the failure to declare the dividend is the result of an 'oppressive or fraudulent abuse of
discretion"' (citations omitted)), affd, 479 A.2d 276 (Del. 1984).
37. The phrase is from Blair & Stout, supra note 8 (manuscript at 31-43).
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here, the earliest corporations were formed only upon the grant of a
special charter by the crown, or in the early United States, by state
charter, and these charters nearly always specified some sort of
public purpose.3 By late in the nineteenth century, however, most
states had passed generalized incorporation laws. 9 Since these
laws made it possible for anyone to incorporate, for any lawful
purpose, the courts and the legislatures felt that it was important
that incorporators state what their purpose was so that they could
be held to that purpose. A compelling fact about the process of
incorporation was that contributors of equity capital were giving up
control over the use of their assets to corporate managers and direc-
tors. Since securities markets were thin or nonexistent at the time,
and there were few reporting requirements imposed on the issuers
of securities, investors lacked some of the assurances available
today that the inputs they provided would not be expropriated. The
courts, then, during the last half of the nineteenth century, and the
first few decades of the twentieth century, tended to interpret and
enforce the doctrine of ultra vires fairly strictly. In 1883, for exam-
ple, a Delaware court ruled that contributions to charity were ultra
vires, or outside the authority of the corporation."
But, just thirteen years later, the courts were taking a more
qualified view, particularly with respect to corporate expenditures
on the provision of health, welfare, or community services that were
likely to benefit employees. In Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,4 the
court observed that "[t]he field of corporate action in respect to the
exercise of incidental powers is thus, I think, an expanding one. As
industrial conditions change, business methods must change with
them, and acts become permissible which at an earlier period would
not have been considered to be within corporate power."42 Subse-
quent cases reiterated the view of the courts that corporate manag-
ers need discretion to use corporate resources in a variety of ways
to provide noncash, noncontractual compensation and other benefits
for employees.' In terms of the Blair and Stout model, corporate
38. See generally HURST, supra note 2.
39. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 73 (1992) (noting that "the movement for 'free
incorporation' laws . . . triumphed between 1850 and 1870").
40. See Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Del. Ch. 654, 668 (1883).
41. 40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896), cited in Shelby D. Green, Corporate Philan.
thropy and the Business Benefit: The Need for Clarity, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239,
241 (1990).
42. 40 N.Y.S. at 720.
43. See, e.g., People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649
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managers and directors needed discretion to be able to use as many
tools as possible to recruit, motivate, energize, and compensate
team members in order to maximize the rents created by the enter-
prise as a whole."
By 1917, legislatures began to support this view when Texas
broadened the statutory corporate purpose beyond pure profit-maxi-
mization, and other states followed along, so that by 1950, nearly
half of the states had done so.' In 1934, the United States Su-
preme Court approved the tax-deductibility of charitable contribu-
tions as a legitimate business expense "when limited to charitable
institutions, hospitals or educational institutions conducted for the
benefit of its employees," and donations "which legitimately repre-
sent a consideration for a benefit flowing directly to the corporation
as an incident of its business."46
Of course, in the famous Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.47 case in
1919, the Michigan Supreme Court reiterated the traditional view
that "a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders."" But, even in that decision, the
court in no way stripped corporate officers and directors of their
wide discretion to pursue that goal in whatever way they thought
appropriate.49 In fact, some scholars have speculated that the
court might not have second-guessed Henry Ford's judgment if he
had justified his desire to retain his company's profits, cut prices of
its products, and greatly expand its production as being in the long
run interest of the corporation and its shareholders (as, indeed, it
probably was).50 Ford instead characterized these actions as an
effort to "employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this in-
(N.Y. App. Div. 1909).
44. This comment is not meant to endorse any given tool over any other tool. The
key issue here is need for discretion, not the merits of any particular use of that discre-
tion.
45. See TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 1164 (Vernon 1918); Morrissey, supra note 2, at 1015
(noting that nearly half of all states had broadened corporate purpose by 1950).
46. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, 293-94 (1934).
The particular donation in this case, to a Community Chest fund, was disqualified, but
that ruling was on the factual question of whether the donation was "a consideration for
a benefit flowing directly to the corporation." Id. at 294.
47. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
48. Id. at 684.
49. See id. (holding that "[t]he discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the
choice of the means to attain that end").
50. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 601 (1992).
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dustrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build
up their lives and their homes."5
In the post-World War II period, as large corporations became
an increasingly dominant feature of the economy, the courts began
to recognize more explicitly that the performance of a given corpo-
ration is connected to the performance of other social institutions,
and to the performance of the economy as a whole. Sometimes
these connections might be subtle. And sometimes managers might
waste resources on projects and relationships that turn out not to
benefit the corporation. But here again, the key issue is that, by
their choice to enter into the corporate "contract," all of the partici-
pants in the firm agree to give up any direct claim on the inputs
they provide and on the output of the firm, and to yield control over
those assets to the discretion of managers and directors, who are
bound by duties of care and duties of loyalty not to use the assets
carelessly, nor expropriate them for their own benefit. Beyond those
constraints, the courts decided, managers and directors should not
be subjected to second guessing by the courts if they decide that it
might be a good idea to expend corporate resources to support edu-
cational or community institutions.
In A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,52 the courts up-
held a $1500 contribution made by the company to Princeton Uni-
versity.' The firm's president justified the donation on the
grounds that the donations would evoke community goodwill and
thereby help create a "favorable environment for their business op-
erations,"' and that the donation would help to support an institu-
tion that would, in turn, help to train future employees." The
company also brought in prominent business leaders to testify that
it was not good business for corporations to avoid the "normally ac-
cepted obligations of citizenship in the community,"56 and that
"corporations have a self-interest in the maintenance of liberal
education as the bulwark of good government."57 The court agreed:
More and more [corporations] have come to recognize that their
51. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
52. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
53. See id. at 590.
54. Id. at 583.
55. See id.
56. Id. (quoting Frank W. Abrams, Chairman of Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey).
57. Id. (quoting Irving S. Olds, Chairman of United States Steel Corporation).
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salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment which
in turn rests in no insignificant part upon free and vigorous non-
governmental institutions of learning. It seems to us that just as
the conditions prevailing when corporations were originally creat-
ed required that they serve public as well as private interests,
modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and
discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of
the communities within which they operate."
For the most part, corporate executives have not grossly abused
the discretion given them under the law. There have been only two
major cases brought to the courts since A.P. Smith in which the
amounts given away by the firms were substantial enough, and the
link to the business goals of the corporation tenuous enough, that
shareholders thought it worth trying to fight.59 These cases are
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson0 and Kahn v. Sullivan.61
In Theodora, Girard Henderson, the largest shareholder and son of
the founder of Alexander Dawson, Inc. (which functioned mainly as
a holding company, holding shares of Avon Products) used his influ-
ence on the board of Alexander Dawson to cause the company to
make a series of donations to the Alexander Dawson Foundation,
which he controlled. These donations ranged in value from $27,923
to $467,750, and occurred from 1960 through 1966. The foundation
used the funds to support the activities of a camp for underprivi-
leged boys which it operated in Colorado. Each of these donations
was approved unanimously by the shareholders. In 1967,
Henderson proposed that another gift, having a value of $528,000,
be made to the foundation, but that year, under pressure from
Henderson's ex-wife (who held somewhat more than twenty-five
percent of the voting shares of Alexander Dawson), several directors
objected. Henderson then used his control over the board to cause
the board to be reduced from eight members to three. The reduced
board then approved the donation, and the ex-wife sued
58. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586.
59. One might argue that the barriers imposed by earlier court decisions are so
high that gross abuses can occur and that shareholders, knowing they can't win, will not
choose to fight them. But, if shareholders were deeply concerned about this issue, we
might expect to see a rush by shareholder activists to propose changes in corporate
charters or bylaws that would limit director discretion to make contributions to phil-
anthropic causes. This has not happened.
60. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
61. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
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derivatively for recovery of the donation (which amounted to 2.76%
of Alexander Dawson's profits in that year).
In the second major case, the board of directors of Occidental
Petroleum Corp. decided in the late 1980s to provide funding for
building and operating an art museum to house the personal art
collection of long-time Occidental chairman Dr. Armand Hammer.
The commitment involved a number of pieces but the estimated
total cost of the commitments made by the board was somewhat
more than $85 million. That represented almost 30% of Occidental's
1989 total net income of $285 million (11.5% of pretax earnings). 2
A significant sum, to be sure, but, of course, the total commitment
to the museum was to be paid out not in a single year, but over
several years, and on an after tax basis, the impact on earnings
would have been smaller.
These two cases are noteworthy because they are exceptional,
in terms of both the size of the contributions relative to corporate
earnings and the extent to which the contributions seemed to in-
volve use of corporate resources for the special benefit of a single
individual - the single largest shareholder in Theodora, and a
powerful founder and long-time CEO in Kahn.' In the language of
Blair & Stout, each donation could be understood as a special bonus
or supplement to compensation paid to an especially powerful "team
member."6
Contributions to pet projects of powerful team members proba-
bly happen on a small scale very frequently. But, it is rare that
they are this large, relative to the size of the companies involved.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, total contributions by large corpo-
rations averaged less than 1% of receipts less deductions, and in
the 1990s, contributions by all corporations with taxable income
62. See Kahn, Pandora's Box, supra note 5, at 619 (citing $85 million in contribu-
tions); OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (reporting $285 million
net income).
63. Jayne Barnard cites several other examples of sizeable corporate contributions
to philanthropic causes that have little or no connection to the financial goals of the
corporation, but that seem motivated entirely by the preferences of the CEO. See
Barnard, supra note 5, at 1160-64.
64. Sugin, supra note 1, at 875-76, argues that the tax treatment of such expendi-
tures by corporations would be more correct if they were treated as compensation to the
executive, and then deductible for the executive on his or her tax returns. Barnard,
supra note 5, at 1170-73, and Kahn, Pandora's Box, supra note 5, at 611, 621, both
argue that such expenditures should be treated as compensation to executives, or at the
very least, corporations should be required to report such expenditures and directors
should review them.
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have continued at this level.'
Moreover, these contributions exhibit a pattern that strongly
suggests that the donations are being made to institutions and
causes that are linked to the business goals of the companies. For
example, one commentator notes that banks, whose fortunes are
often tied very closely to the health of the individual communities
where they are located, tend to give nearly half of their total contri-
butions to health and human services causes, and only about a
quarter of their contributions to education.6 Chemical companies,
on the other hand, which have a higher need for technically-trained
employees than banks, give more than 40% of their contributions to
education.67 Oil companies and cigarette companies, which have
faced severe public relations problems in the past few decades, have
focused their giving on culture and the arts, whereas industrial
products companies, which have little need for high visibility among
general consumers, typically give very little to culture and the
arts.
68
In a carefully structured statistical test, Peter Navarro found
evidence that corporate contributions could be explained better by
profit-maximization motives than they could by managerial discre-
tion motives.' In particular, he found evidence that "corporate
contributions represent a form of advertising," and that contribu-
tions to causes and institutions that enhance the attractiveness of
the communities where firms operate "represent a quasi-fringe
benefit to firm employees."7" Meanwhile, he found no relation be-
tween contributions and either executive compensation or the de-
gree of managerial control of the firms in his sample.7
Thus, while abuses do occur, the available evidence suggests
that corporate managers and directors have not, in general, grossly
abused the discretion given them by the legislatures and courts. Yet
65. See David R. Morgan, Trends in Corporate Charitable Contributions, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 771, 776 (1997); Michael Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NON-
PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 340, 341 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). Compa-
nies are entitled to take tax deductions for charitable contributions up to 10% of pretax
net income. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
66. See Useem, supra note 65, at 342.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity?, 61 J. Bus. 65 (1988).
70. Id. at 90.
71. See id.; see also Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1994, at 105, 113 (arguing that "the new paradigm removes much of
the CEO's control over giving decisions").
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even in Theodora and Kahn, the courts ultimately upheld the
board's authority to make the contributions in question, and dis-
missed the claims against directors for breach of their fiduciary
obligations. 2 Under a theory of corporate law based on a "bundle
of assets that belongs to shareholders" model, these decisions would
be troubling. But under a theory of corporate law based on a model
of corporations as solutions to team production problems, these
decisions seem much more understandable.
IV. TEAM PRODUCTION PROBLEMS AND THE "SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES" OF CORPORATIONS
The argument that forms the basis of this paper is that the
economic function of corporation law is to provide a solution to the
contracting problems inherent in team production. In arguments
first developed elsewhere, Professor Stout and I claim that this
view of the nature and purpose of corporations goes a long way to-
ward explaining aspects of corporation law that do not make sense
when viewed from the perspective of principal-agent theory. 3 Our
theory argues that the solution imposed by corporation law is to
assign decision rights over the use of corporate assets to a set of
individuals who have duties of loyalty and duties of care to the
corporation itself.
The team production theory of corporation law rejects the an-
thropomorphic notion that corporations have social responsibilities
because their status as separate legal entities implies that they
must be "good citizens." But, it suggests that corporate executives
and directors who are doing their job right are not only entitled to,
but may at times be responsible for, directing that corporate assets
be used in ways that are "socially responsible." Although the team
production theory of corporate law was derived from economic rea-
soning, it suggests that corporations are fundamentally political
and social institutions.74 Since team members can be expected to
72. In Kahn, the issue at stake was a challenge to a settlement agreement between
Occidental board members and another shareholder who had challenged the decision to
support the museum. The Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the Chancery Court
had been correct in applying the business judgment rule to the settlement agreement,
and in concluding that, "given the net worth of Occidental, its annual net income before
taxes, and the tax benefits to Occidental, that the gift to the museum was within the
range of reasonableness established in Theodora Holding Corp. u. Henderson." Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
73. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 8.
74. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 287 (1996) (stress-
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use the political tools available to them, in addition to economic and
legal tools, to try to capture as much of the rents from the joint
enterprise as they can, corporate managers and directors must also
be allowed to use such tools. They must be free to encourage the
participation and cooperation of employees, for example, with a
variety of incentives, including moral suasion,75 social pres-
sures,76 and gift exchanges, 77 in addition to contractual reward
and punishment incentives. And, they may also find it necessary or
useful from time to time to utilize those tools in their relationships
with customers, or lenders, or suppliers, or even community lead-
ers, voters, and members of the media.
If participants in the joint enterprise being undertaken by the
firm are uncomfortable with giving corporate executives and direc-
tors such wide discretion, they could, presumably, structure their
relationship differently. They could organize the firm as a limited
partnership or a close corporation rather than a public corporation;
or they could lend the firm money rather than investing in equity;
or they could work as subcontractors rather than as employees. The
fact that so much economic activity is organized within the private
governance structures created under the law of public corporations
suggests that participants in these enterprises find it in their inter-
ests to operate this way. This, in turn, suggests that the discretion
granted to corporate managers and directors is serving an impor-
tant economic purpose.
ing "the importance of viewing the firm as a political institution").
75. See generally MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBLITY OF COOPERATION (1987) (dis-
cussing the prisoner's dilemma); TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
76. See generally David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle
eds., 1990).
77. See generally RICHARD M. TITUIJSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971); George
Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982).
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